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he Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX), the 
nation’s oldest, has survived alongside much 
larger and more liquid securities markets. How 
has it managed to do so? In this article, John 
Caskey explains some of the factors that account for the 
PHLX’s long life and how their importance has varied over 
time. Although Caskey focuses on the evolution of the 
PHLX, he also profiles some of the seismic shifts in U.S. 
securities markets in recent decades and illuminates the 
role of the largely overlooked regional stock exchanges.
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1 The book by Larry Harris contains an 
excellent nontechnical discussion of order flow 
externalities as well as competition among 
centers for trading securities.
2 This article draws heavily on my working 
paper, which contains a much more detailed 
and more fully documented discussion of the 
evolution of the PHLX. 
3 A stock exchange is a place where buyers and 
sellers meet to trade securities (see the Glossary 
on page 28).
Conventional wisdom holds 
that securities trading will shift to the 
most liquid markets.  After all, all else 
being equal, people buying a security 
would like to direct their orders to 
the market with the largest number 
of sellers, and people selling a security 
would like to direct their orders to 
the market with the largest number of 
buyers.  This maximizes the chances 
that buyers and sellers get the best 
price possible for their trades and that 
they will complete their trades quickly. 
Market professionals have 
long acknowledged this effect and 
have succinctly captured it in the 
common phrase “liquidity attracts 
liquidity.” This point has also been 
recognized by academic economists, 
who refer to it as an “order flow exter-
nality,” or more generally, a “network 
externality.”1   It is an externality 
because when one person directs an 
order to a particular market, it benefits 
other people trading in the same 
market.  
Over most of its long life, the 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX) 
has survived alongside much larger and 
more liquid securities markets.  This 
article explains how it managed to do 
so despite order flow externalities.2  
In brief, a number of factors played a 
role, including communication costs, 
membership standards on dominant 
exchanges, incentives to avoid fixed 
trading commissions, a differentiation 
of trading technologies, an unwilling-
ness to permit markets to compete in 
the trading of equity options, and the 
development of new products that were 
not traded on other markets. 
The importance of these 
factors has varied over time.  While fo-
cusing on the evolution of the PHLX, 
in the background, I will profile some 
of the seismic shifts in U.S. securities 
markets in recent decades and illumi-
nate the role of the largely overlooked 
regional stock exchanges.  
PRE-1960: COMMUNICATION 
COSTS AND NYSE MEMBER-
SHIP AND LISTING
STANDARDS
The Philadelphia Stock 
Exchange dates its founding to 1790, 
making it the country’s oldest stock 
exchange.3  Although the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) was founded 
two years later, it soon surpassed all 
other stock exchanges in trading vol-
ume.  By the late 1830s, for example, 
the reported share volume on the 
PHLX was about 14 percent of that on 
the NYSE.  Undoubtedly this reflected 
the fact that by the 1830s, New York 
City had become the major center for 
commerce.   
Over the 19th century, an in-
creasing share of the trading in finan-
cial securities, especially for the largest 
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In the 1920s, the volume of trading on the 
PHLX, as on many other regional exchanges, 
increased dramatically.
firms or public projects, migrated to 
the NYSE because of the liquidity and 
depth of that market.  But relatively 
high communication costs enabled 
the regional exchanges to compete in 
the first half of the century.  Phila-
delphians could not quickly discover 
the prices of securities trading in New 
York, nor could they quickly transmit 
orders to trade to that city.  In other 
words, communication costs offset the 
tendency for the trading of securities 
to concentrate in one market center, 
and regional securities exchanges 
flourished.  
The development of the 
telegraph in the 1850s and the ticker 
tape in the 1870s began to change 
this situation.   The Philadelphia 
Stock Exchange, and other regional 
exchanges, responded by increasingly 
listing and trading the securities of 
firms that could not meet the listing 
requirements of the NYSE, such as 
an exchange-specified minimum ag-
gregate market value of publicly held 
shares or an exchange-specified mini-
mum number of public shareholders.  
The firms that were unable to meet 
the NYSE listing requirements tended 
to be younger and smaller firms little 
known outside their local markets.   
In addition, many states exempted 
any company listed on an exchange, 
including the regional exchanges, from 
their “blue sky” laws.  These laws of-
fered some protection against fraud by 
requiring that securities sold within a 
state be registered with that state.  The 
exemption created a strong incentive 
for firms that were unable to meet 
NYSE listing standards but that did 
not want to incur the costs of register-
ing their securities in multiple states to 
list on a regional exchange.  
In the 1920s, the volume of 
trading on the PHLX, as on many 
other regional exchanges, increased 
dramatically.  In the subsequent stock 
market crash and economic depres-
sion, many of the firms listed on the 
regional exchanges failed or were 
absorbed in mergers, and trading 
volume fell precipitously.  In addition, 
states changed their blue sky laws to 
limit exemptions for securities listed 
on regional exchanges, and the newly 
created Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) required the exchanges 
to impose stricter listing requirements.  
These developments greatly decreased 
listings and trading volume on the 
regional exchanges. Gradually, the 
over-the-counter (OTC) market (see 
the Glossary) replaced the regional 
exchanges as the location where 
newly issued equities would trade and 
become “seasoned” before the issuing 
firm might seek a listing on the NYSE 
or the American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX).    
As the regional exchanges 
lost listings and trading volume, they 
responded by starting to trade se-
curities listed on the NYSE and the 
AMEX.  In 1931, for example, the 
PHLX allowed trading to begin in any 
security listed on the NYSE or the 
AMEX.  Since these securities were 
generally not listed on the PHLX, 
this was called “unlisted” trading.  By 
1961, only 1.2 percent of the dollar 
volume of stock trading on the PHLX 
came from the 88 stocks that had sole 
listings on that exchange (SEC, 1963, 
Table VIII-76).  The vast majority of 
stocks traded on the PHLX were ones 
listed on the NYSE.  
As the PHLX evolved into an 
exchange that mainly traded equities 
listed on the NYSE, it also evolved to 
resemble more closely a dealer market 
rather than an auction market.  In 
most cases, the only person buying or 
selling a particular stock on the floor 
of the exchange was the designated 
specialist (see the Glossary).  There 
were no competing market makers on 
the floor, and it was rare for brokers 
representing buy and sell orders to 
interact directly.  The counterparty 
to nearly all trades was the specialist.  
This was true for the trading of un-
listed securities on the other regional 
exchanges as well (SEC, 1963, p. 932).
Over the 1950s and into the 
1960s, brokers directed orders to the 
PHLX rather than to the more liquid 
NYSE for a variety of reasons. For 
one, specialists on the PHLX would 
generally set their prices to within 
$0.125 of the price of the last reported 
transaction on the NYSE, thereby 
guaranteeing brokers that their prices 
were nearly as good, and sometimes 
as good, as those on the NYSE.  This 
practice was common on the regional 
exchanges. In addition, small and 
medium-size brokerage firms with their 
headquarters in the mid-Atlantic re-
gion were often members of the PHLX 
but not the NYSE, since membership 
in the PHLX required far less capital. 
If such firms received an order to trade 
a security listed on the NYSE and they 
directed it to the NYSE for execution, 
they would have to pay the “public” 
fixed commission paid by all non-
members. Alternatively, if such firms 
executed the order on the PHLX, they 
could keep most of the public commis-
sion paid by their customers, paying 
only a minor member commission to 
the PHLX. 
Firms that were sole mem-
bers of the PHLX would direct some 
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5 The data for all of the figures come from 
the annual reports of the Philadelphia Stock 
Exchange.  Figures 1 and 2 present the data 
using log scaling, also called ratio scaling, 
since this allows a clearer picture of percentage 
changes. For example, an increase in volume 
from $100 to $1,000 represents the same 
percentage change as an increase from $1,000 
to $10,000.
4 Except where specifically indicated otherwise, 
I measure an exchange’s market share using 
the dollar volume of trading as a percentage of 
overall exchange-based trading in dollars.
FIGURE 1
Volume of PHLX Equity Trades
in Millions of Dollars
 orders to the NYSE, either because 
the trade was too large to be executed 
quickly on the PHLX or because the 
security was not traded on the PHLX. 
Since a member’s cost of executing an 
order on the NYSE was well below the 
minimum public commission, members 
competed aggressively to attract orders 
from nonmembers. The NYSE did not 
permit its members to discount public 
commissions or offer cash rebates to 
compete in attracting orders; however, 
the members could reward nonmember 
brokerage firms that were members of 
a regional exchange by sending them 
orders to execute on the regional 
exchange. Such orders were referred 
to as reciprocal order flow, and they 
accounted for a significant share of the 
trades directed to the PHLX and other 
regional exchanges during the 1950s 
and 1960s. In this way, the brokerage 
firm that was a sole member of a re-
gional exchange could indirectly earn 
public commissions for handling orders 
that it directed to an NYSE member.  
With the decline of regional 
brokerage firms and the rise of the 
OTC market, between 1930 and 1960 
most of the regional exchanges saw a 
fairly consistent decline in their market 
share, measured as a percentage of the 
value of equities traded on all exchang-
es. Many regional exchanges closed 
or were absorbed by other exchanges 
during this era.  The PHLX managed 
to survive, but by the 1950s, its market 
share in exchange-traded equities 
hovered fairly consistently around 1 
percent.4  This is despite its absorption 
of the Baltimore Stock Exchange in 
1949 and the Washington, D.C. Stock 
Exchange in 1953.
1960-74:  A NICHE CREATED BY 
FIXED COMMISSIONS
The dollar volume of shares 
traded on the PHLX grew rapidly 
between 1960 and 1972 (Figure 1).5  By 
1972, the market share of the PHLX 
in exchange-traded equities had risen 
to 2.5 percent.  This rebound for the 
PHLX was largely due to its ability to 
exploit opportunities created by the 
fixed commission rules.  
As noted earlier, the NYSE 
and the regional exchanges specified 
minimum public commissions with 
no volume discounts.  NYSE rules 
prevented cash rebates by members
to nonmembers, but members could 
share commissions with other mem-
bers. In the early 1960s, the regional 
exchanges had similar rules. At the 
same time, the Investment Company 
Act of 1940 placed a cap on the com-
missions that mutual funds could 
pay retail sales organizations. Mutual 
funds often wished to exceed this cap 
in order to sweeten the incentive for 
retail brokerage firms to sell shares 
in their funds. They found several 
ways to evade the cap.  If a firm that 
sold shares in the mutual fund was a 
member of the NYSE, the mutual fund 
could reward it by asking it to execute 
trades on its behalf, paying the firm 
the fixed commission for this service.  
If the mutual fund preferred to use its 
traditional NYSE-member firm for ex-
ecuting trades, it could direct that firm 
to share its trading commission with 
another NYSE-member firm that the 
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In 1965, to attract even more business based 
on mutual fund-directed give-ups, the PHLX 
changed its rules to permit commissions to 
be shared with brokerage firms that were not 
members of the PHLX. 
6 See the book by Joel Seligman.
7 See the Elkins Wetherill reference.
8 At this time, there was another interesting 
development in the history of the PHLX.  In 
December 1968, in response to a fiscal crisis, 
Philadelphia imposed a $0.05 per share stock 
transfer tax for all transactions on the PHLX. 
On January 2, 1969, the PHLX moved its 
trading floor to an office building just across 
the street from the city boundary to avoid the 
tax.  In February 1969, a court ruled that the 
tax was illegal, and the PHLX moved its trading 
floor back to its headquarters in the city.
mutual fund wished to reward.  This 
was known as a give-up.
But many small brokerage 
firms that sold shares in mutual funds 
to retail clients were not members of 
the NYSE.  If they were members of a 
regional exchange, there was a way to 
reward them for these sales.  Assuming 
the firm that traditionally executed 
trades for the mutual fund was not 
only a member of the NYSE but also 
a member of the regional exchange in 
which the smaller brokerage firm was a 
member, the mutual fund could ask its 
brokerage firm to execute some trades 
on that regional exchange and share 
commissions with the smaller firm.  In 
the early 1960s, such arrangements 
accounted for a substantial share of 
the order flow on regional exchanges 
(SEC, 1963, p. 316-17).  The regional 
exchanges could handle the associated 
large block trades because the trades 
were generally pre-arranged off the 
floor of the exchange.  
In 1965, to attract even more 
business based on mutual fund-di-
rected give-ups, the PHLX changed 
its rules to permit commissions to 
be shared with brokerage firms that 
were not members of the PHLX (1965 
PHLX Annual Report). Some small 
brokerage firms that sold shares in 
mutual funds were not members of any 
exchange, so mutual funds could direct 
trading orders to the PHLX in order to 
reward them. 
The New York Stock Ex-
change was, of course, unhappy to see 
trades that would normally be ex-
ecuted on its floor diverted to regional 
exchanges. It lobbied the SEC to halt 
all cash give-ups.  The SEC agreed 
with the NYSE that give-ups could 
undermine fixed trading commissions 
and the cap on mutual fund sales 
commissions. In December 1968, all 
commission splitting ended when the 
exchanges agreed to ban the practice 
under pressure from the SEC.
The loss of institutional 
business associated with the end of 
give-ups could have been a major blow 
to the PHLX. It was not, however, 
because the PHLX instituted two new 
measures to attract institutional trades. 
In the 1960s, the NYSE did not allow 
institutions active in a wide range of 
activities to become members of the 
exchange.  Membership was open only 
to entities whose primary purpose was 
serving the public as brokers or market 
makers. In addition, the NYSE did not 
permit foreign-owned securities firms 
to become members. This forced large 
foreign banks, many of which actively 
traded American securities on behalf 
of clients, to pay the public commis-
sion to trade on the NYSE.  
Prior to 1967, the PHLX had 
similar policies. However, beginning 
in 1967, the PHLX allowed securities 
firms that were owned by mutual fund 
companies, insurance companies, and 
foreign-owned financial institutions to 
become members.6  By early 1971, 39 
such institutionally affiliated securities 
firms had joined the PHLX and began 
to trade on behalf of the institutions 
that owned them.7  The institutional 
investors still had to pay the minimum 
public commission, but they paid it to 
firms owned by the institutions them-
selves. In this way, the institutions 
effectively received a discount from 
public commissions. Not surprisingly, 
this strategy was very successful for 
the PHLX.  As reported in the PHLX 
Annual Report for 1969, 37 percent of 
its stock trading volume came from 
institutional trades in 1968 and 45 
percent in 1969.8
Trading on the PHLX 
boomed between the early 1960s and 
1972 as the exchange employed these 
means for institutional investors to 
evade caps on mutual fund sales com-
missions and minimum public trading 
commissions. But by the late 1960s, 
many influential policymakers and pol-
icy analysts had become very critical of 
exchange-specified minimum trading 
commissions, and they advocated price 
liberalization.  In April 1971, the SEC 
approved negotiated commission rates 
on orders above $500,000. This led 
institutions to redirect some of their 
large trades to the NYSE, since they 
could negotiate discounted commis-
sions. With this change, the PHLX’s 
market share fell slightly between 1972 
and 1974.
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9 See the article by Jane Sasseen, and Securities 
Week, February 17, 1986.
AFTER 1975: SURVIVAL
BY DIFFERENTIATION,
INNOVATION, AND UNIQUE 
OPTION LISTINGS
Equities. In May 1975, all of 
the exchanges eliminated minimum 
public trading commissions.  This led 
to a rapid fall in commissions, espe-
cially for institutions with large trading 
orders.  Institutions that had been 
directing some of their trades to the 
PHLX to evade the fixed commissions 
began to return to the NYSE because 
of its superior liquidity and price com-
petition.  
The deregulation of brokerage 
commissions also 
led to the rise of 
“discount” bro-
kerage firms that 
charged low fees 
for providing ba-
sic retail trading 
services. Since 
they charged 
low commissions 
for handling 
the trades, they 
had to execute 
these trades at a 
very low cost in 
order to make a 
profit. Since the profit on each trade 
was small, they sought to handle a 
high volume of retail trades. The 
discount brokers therefore valued fast 
and reliable executions of their trades 
more than they valued a time-consum-
ing search for the best possible price. 
Discount brokers argued that, in most 
cases, their customers gained more 
from low commissions than they would 
from the slightly improved prices they 
might get from slower executions.   
The PHLX responded to the 
changes that diminished its order flow 
from institutions by developing systems 
to meet the needs of the discount 
brokers. In other words, it hoped to 
overcome the order flow externality by 
offering a trading system that was in-
tentionally differentiated from that of 
the NYSE and designed to better meet 
the needs of a subset of traders.
To attract the order flow from 
the emerging discount brokers, the 
PHLX had to offer automated, reliable 
executions at prices close to the best 
prices available anywhere.  To do so, in 
1975 the PHLX introduced a comput-
erized order-handling and execution 
system called PACE. PACE would 
route a retail order to the proper spe-
cialist. Orders that met predetermined 
criteria could be executed automati-
cally by the specialist. The specialist 
would frequently guarantee that the 
price of the trade would match that 
of the best bid or offer quoted on any 
other exchange.  As they bought and 
sold shares, the specialists hoped to 
profit from the spread between the bid 
and ask prices.
Matching the best quoted bid 
or offer shown on other exchanges did 
not necessarily mean that orders sent 
to a PHLX specialist received as favor-
able a price as they might have, had 
the order gone to the NYSE. Often, 
competitive bidding on the floor of the 
NYSE would lead to price improve-
ments over the best quoted price. Such 
price improvements were infrequent 
on the regional exchanges, since their 
specialists rarely faced competition on 
their floors.  
Partly in response to the au-
tomation of retail order flow by several 
of the regional exchanges and third 
market dealers, the NYSE also moved 
to automate much of its retail order 
flow.  But for many years its system 
had built-in delays to allow compet-
ing bids or offers from the floor of the 
exchange. PACE did not have this 
feature, making its system faster. PACE 
succeeded in attracting a new flow of 
retail orders to the PHLX, but the ex-
change continued to lose market share 
as large institutional orders returned 
to the NYSE fol-
lowing the 1975 
deregulation of 
fixed trading com-
missions.  
As noted 
earlier, specialists 
on the regional 
exchanges and 
OTC dealers 
competed with 
each other to 
attract retail 
order flow since 
they could profit 
from the spread 
between the bid and ask price.  Not 
surprisingly, in competing for this 
order flow, specialists on the regional 
exchanges and OTC dealers began to 
offer financial incentives to brokerage 
firms that were willing to direct orders 
to them.  This became known as pay-
ment for order flow. It is not clear who 
initiated the practice and when, but by 
the mid-1980s, there were reports that 
the practice was widespread.9  Discount 
brokers, who were competing with 
each other to charge the lowest trading 
commission, were particularly likely to 
seek payments for order flow.  These 
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10 A stock option gives the purchaser the right, 
but not the obligation, to purchase or sell a 
stock at a specified price on or before a specified 
date.
payments enabled them to cover their 
operating costs by means other than 
commissions.  Many people took a dim 
view of payment for order flow out of 
concern that it could lead brokers to 
direct trades on the basis of the pay-
ments rather than their clients’ best 
interests.  
Over most of the 1980s and 
1990s, the PHLX saw the volume of 
its equity trading grow, as did all stock 
exchanges in the generally booming 
markets.  But for the management of 
the PHLX and its traders, there were 
also worrying trends. During this era, 
the PHLX slowly lost market share.  In 
1980, the PHLX handled 1.6 percent 
of the dollar value of stocks traded on 
exchanges. By 1999, this had declined 
to 0.65 percent.  In addition, the 
per-trade profit margins of the special-
ists declined as competitive pressures 
forced them to pay to attract orders. 
Plus spreads had narrowed because 
of the move to pricing stocks to the 
penny, rather than in fractions of a dol-
lar, by 2001.  Not only did the PHLX 
specialists compete with specialists on 
other exchanges for orders, but in late 
2001, the PHLX also permitted more 
than one specialist to be designated for 
a stock, leading to potential competi-
tion within the exchange for orders.
Options. By 2001, however, 
the PHLX was trading more than just 
stocks.  In June 1975, the PHLX began 
to trade options on equities.10   It was 
the third exchange to do so.  The Chi-
cago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) 
had pioneered this path when it began 
to trade stock options in April 1973.  
In January 1975, the American Stock 
Exchange became the second exchange 
to trade equity options. It was followed 
shortly afterward by the PHLX and the 
Pacific Stock Exchange.  These later 
entrants could overcome the order 
flow externality because the exchanges 
generally did not trade options traded 
on another exchange.  
When the PHLX introduced 
options trading, it started on a limited 
basis and expanded slowly over time.  
The main reason that the PHLX was 
slow to add new equity options was 
that the CBOE and the AMEX had al-
ready listed the most desirable options 
by the time the PHLX began to look 
for listings. Prior to 1977, although 
there was no rule that prevented the 
exchanges from doing so, the ex-
changes rarely listed options contracts 
that were already traded on another 
exchange.  
As I discuss below, people lat-
er charged that the options exchanges 
did not list each other’s options be-
cause of an implicit agreement to limit 
competition among the exchanges. In 
addition, the SEC and the exchanges 
expressed concerns about multiple 
listing of options contracts, since, un-
like the equity exchanges, the options 
exchanges were not “linked”: that is, 
there was no organized system to tell 
traders instantly on one exchange 
about the quoted bid and offer prices 
and volumes on other exchanges. 
Furthermore, there was no process 
to ensure that an order directed to 
one exchange would not trade at a 
price less favorable than the quote on 
another exchange. The SEC worried 
that public investors might be taken 
advantage of in such “fragmented” 
markets.  
In 1977, the SEC conveyed 
its concerns about market fragmenta-
tion by placing a moratorium on the 
listing of new equity options while it 
studied the options market.  In June 
1980, the SEC initiated a lottery for 
allocating the right to trade any new 
options on equities. Under this system, 
the exchanges would let the SEC know 
which equity options they wished to 
list. The SEC then used a lottery to al-
locate the exclusive right to trade these 
options to specific exchanges.  
Under the SEC lottery sys-
tem, the flow of option trades to the 
exchanges depended on their ability 
to attract business for the options they 
had listed prior to the moratorium of 
1977 and their luck in obtaining the 
right to list desirable equity options 
through the lottery. By these measures, 
the PHLX did well.  The market share 
that the PHLX had in equity options 
hovered around 3 percent between 
1976 and 1978. During this period, the 
CBOE, with its first-mover advantage, 
had over 70 percent of the market.  
The AMEX’s share hovered around 20 
percent.
But the rapid growth in 
equity option trades on the PHLX be-
tween 1978 and 1983 led to a tripling 
of its market share (Figure 2). By 1983, 
it had almost 9 percent of the overall 
volume of equity option trades on ex-
changes. This created bustling activity 
on the options floor because unlike the 
equity floor, it was active with market 
makers trading for their own accounts 
alongside brokers and specialists.  In 
addition, in 1983, the PHLX began to 
trade options on stock indexes.  Over 
time, these would become a significant 
part of its options business.  
Over most of the 
1980s and 1990s, the 
PHLX saw the volume 
of its equity trading 
grow, as did all stock 
exchanges in the
generally booming 
markets. 
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FIGURE 2
Volume of PHLX Equity Options Trades
in Millions of Dollars
Reportedly, a substantial 
share of option orders in the 1980s 
came from individuals and institu-
tions speculating on possible takeover 
targets. The PHLX, along with other 
options exchanges, experienced a 
slump in the volume of options trad-
ing between 1990 and 1992. This is 
commonly attributed to the end of 
the corporate takeover era associated 
with the 1990 failure of the invest-
ment bank Drexel Burnham and the 
creation of more effective corporate 
takeover defenses. 
Beginning in 1996, there 
was a renewed boom in equity option 
trading, much of which represented 
speculation or hedging in the stocks 
of high-flying technology compa-
nies. Since many of these firms were 
relatively young, the CBOE and the 
AMEX had not generally listed options 
on their stocks prior to the entry of 
the PHLX into options trading.  Thus, 
the PHLX had almost as substantial 
a listing of options on the stocks of 
these firms as did any other exchange.  
When the boom began, the PHLX was 
well positioned to participate. Whether 
measured in absolute trading volume 
or market share, between 1996 and 
1998, the PHLX saw rapid growth in 
trading on its equity options floor.  
Throughout the 1980s and 
into the 1990s, the system of listing an 
equity option on only one exchange 
was constantly threatened.  While it 
held the lotteries, the SEC pressured 
the options exchanges to create a link-
age system. But the options exchanges 
failed to do so. Frustrated, the SEC 
decided to end the exchanges’
monopolies in options listings.
The SEC took an incremental 
approach. In 1985, it decided that the 
right to trade options on OTC stocks 
would not be allocated through a lot-
tery.  These options could be listed on 
multiple exchanges.  In January 1990, 
the SEC ended its lottery system for 
allocating options on exchange-listed 
stocks.  The SEC ruled that henceforth 
any options listed for the first time on 
an exchange could be listed on another 
exchange.  
These changes in policy had 
only modest effects.  By the mid-1990s 
all restrictions on multiple listings 
had been lifted, but the exchanges 
still chose not to list options that had 
been allocated to other exchanges 
under the lottery system.  In mid-1999, 
about 60 percent of equity options 
still traded on only one exchange, and 
these included most of the more active 
options.11  The PHLX, for example, 
was the only exchange to trade options 
in Dell computers prior to late 1999.  
This was an extremely active option 
— it alone accounted for 30 to 50 per-
cent of the volume in equity options 
on the PHLX during much of 1999. 
By 1999, two developments 
finally led to the breakdown of the 
practice of listing equity options 
contracts on only one exchange.  First, 
in 1998, several large securities firms 
announced that they were investing 
in the creation of an all-electronic 
options exchange, to be known as the 
International Securities Exchange 
(ISE).  The backers of the ISE also 
announced that this exchange would 
trade the most active options contracts 
traded on other exchanges.  In other 
words, it planned to break the monop-
olies that the exchanges had enjoyed 
in many options listings.  Second, the 
SEC and the U.S. Justice Department 
charged that there was a “gentleman’s 
agreement” among the exchanges not 
to compete in equity options, and they 
filed lawsuits against the exchanges.  
By late 1999, the litigation 
threat and the threat by the ISE to 
list other exchanges’ options contracts 
11 Financial Times, August 19, 1999, p. 28.
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finally had the result the SEC de-
sired. In August 1999, the CBOE and 
AMEX broke the alleged gentleman’s 
agreement when they began to trade 
options in Dell computers.  They im-
mediately attracted a significant share 
of the Dell order flow away from the 
PHLX.   Not surprisingly, the PHLX 
retaliated by listing several of the most 
actively traded options listed on the 
CBOE and AMEX.12  
By early 2000, the four 
options exchanges (CBOE, AMEX, 
PHLX, and Pacific Stock Exchange 
[PSE]) were increasingly listing the 
options contracts that were active on 
other exchanges.  This competition 
became even more heated when the 
ISE options exchange opened for busi-
ness in May 2000.  As its backers had 
pledged, it listed the most active op-
tions contracts from other exchanges.    
Many people had argued that 
multiple listing of options contracts 
might be particularly damaging to the 
PHLX, since it had a relatively small 
market share and depended heavily 
on a small number of active options 
contracts. Contrary to these concerns, 
the move to multiple listings benefited 
the PHLX in the near term, partly 
because of the way the PHLX man-
aged it.  When the CBOE and the 
AMEX began to trade the Dell options 
that were the backbone of the PHLX 
in the late 1990s, the PHLX immedi-
ately retaliated by permitting several 
of its specialists to begin trading some 
of the options contracts from other 
exchanges.  
After that, however, the 
PHLX proceeded at a more deliberate 
pace. The exchange would announce 
plans to trade an options contract 
active on another exchange. But 
rather than allocating the specialist 
12 New York Times, August 24, 1999, p. C3.
position to one of the firms already 
active on the PHLX, it would offer 
it to a large specialist operation that 
had not previously traded on the 
PHLX.  In this way, the PHLX used 
the opportunity to list desirable new 
options contracts to entice the largest 
and best capitalized specialist firms to 
become active on the PHLX.  Since 
these firms could attract a high volume 
of order flow, this brought new orders 
to the floor of the PHLX.  
As the exchanges competed 
for each other’s order flow, it is perhaps 
not surprising that the specialists on 
the various options exchanges began 
to pay for order flow.13  In July 2000, 
the CBOE escalated this competition 
by instituting a system that effectively 
taxed all its specialists and market 
makers to raise funds for order flow 
payments.  In August 2000, the 
PHLX retaliated, instituting a system 
similar to that of the CBOE but with 
even higher fees on its specialists and 
market makers and higher order flow 
payments.  This policy, along with the 
increasing presence of large specialist 
firms trading on the PHLX, helped 
feed a boom in PHLX order flow in 
late 2000 and early 2001. Between mid 
2001 and late 2003, the CBOE, the 
PHLX, and the AMEX stopped their 
exchange-sponsored payment for order 
flow systems. But they re-instituted 
them as they lost market share to 
the PSE and the ISE, which had 
maintained their systems. 
Currency Options.  
Although the PHLX demonstrated 
foresight in moving relatively early to 
trade equity options, it cannot claim 
to have pioneered this development.  It 
simply copied the innovation that the 
CBOE had launched.  In the case of 
currency options, the PHLX was the 
innovator.  
In the late 1970s, there was a 
huge spot market in foreign exchange 
and active over-the-counter forward 
and exchange-based futures markets.  
There was no organized market for 
foreign exchange options.  A staff 
member of the PHLX proposed that 
the PHLX initiate trading options 
on foreign currencies.  Following his 
suggestion, the PHLX started a long 
and complicated process to obtain 
approval from the SEC.  
The PHLX opened its 
currency options trading floor in 
December 1982. Trading volume 
started small and grew slowly but 
steadily. Orders came from small-scale 
speculators and from nonfinancial 
and financial businesses, many based 
in Europe, that used the exchange to 
hedge risks. In the first year of trading, 
the product appeared to be headed for 
success.14  
As the PHLX worked to 
promote its fledgling currency options 
market, large commercial banks and 
investment banks increasingly began 
to write tailor-made currency options 
contracts for their corporate custom-
ers who were looking for better ways 
13 Wall Street Letter, October 25, 1999. 14 Financial Times, October 6, 1983, p. I16.
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to hedge exchange-rate risks.15  The 
banks hedged their own net risk expo-
sures by taking appropriate positions 
in the spot market or futures market, 
by trading currency options with each 
other in a developing OTC market, 
and by trading options on the PHLX.  
When the banks traded on the PHLX, 
their orders were generally far larger 
than the specialists and market mak-
ers could handle.  The banks would 
therefore use a broker to find another 
institution, generally another bank, 
willing to take the other side of the 
trade.  Once the two parties agreed 
to the terms of the trade, they would 
execute it on the floor of the exchange. 
This practice enabled the exchange to 
handle large trades smoothly, and it 
contributed to a rapid growth in trad-
ing volume between 1983 and 1987 
(Figure 3).  
By mid-1984, the PHLX had 
become the dominant trading center 
for what could become a very large 
market. Financial officers at large 
and internationally active firms that 
never knew Philadelphia had a stock 
exchange were now acutely aware of 
its presence.16  The success the PHLX 
was having with currency options was 
not lost on other exchanges, several of 
which also began to trade them. The 
CBOE, for example, began to trade 
currency options two years after the 
PHLX initiated the market. But it 
could never overcome Philadelphia’s 
first-mover advantage, and few traders 
could see any reason to divert order 
flow from the PHLX.  In August 1987, 
the CBOE withdrew from the business. 
After several years of rapid 
growth, the volume of trades on the 
PHLX leveled off between 1987 and 
1990.  This was primarily due to the 
FIGURE 3
Volume of PHLX Currency Options Traded
growth of the over-the-counter market 
and the creation of exchange-rate 
bands for the European currencies that 
belonged to the European Monetary 
System.  The reduced volatility of 
these currencies relative to each other 
reduced the demand to hedge currency 
risks and opportunities for speculation. 
Nevertheless, this was a halcyon era 
for many PHLX currency options trad-
ers, who reaped substantial profits from 
market-making and speculating on the 
floor of the exchange that dominated 
currency options.  Growth in trad-
ing volume resumed with the turmoil 
among European exchange rates of the 
early 1990s.17  
After the peak in 1993, the 
volume of trading in currency options 
on the PHLX started a precipitous de-
cline. By 2000, trading volume was so 
low that currency options represented 
an insignificant part of the business of 
the exchange.  This decline was mainly 
caused by the continued growth of 
the OTC market.  Many corporations 
preferred to hedge in the OTC market, 
since banks would tailor contracts to 
their specific needs.  In addition, the 
major international banks that had 
provided much of the order flow to 
the PHLX began to deal exclusively in 
the OTC market. By the early 1990s, 
this market was well developed, with 
numerous very well-capitalized market 
makers. As the market had developed 
in the mid-1980s, the options contracts 
that banks traded among each other 
to hedge their net exposures became 
standardized, adding to their liquidity.18  
LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
This brief account of the 
evolution of the PHLX illustrates 
16 Financial Times, October 2, 1984, p. I13.
15 American Banker, January 24, 1984, p. 1.
17 Philadelphia Inquirer, September 18, 1992,
p. A16.
18 Financial Times, December 11, 1985, p. III6. In 
a report issued by the International Monetary 
Fund, Garry Schinasi and co-authors (2000, 
p. 64) describe the forces that led the OTC 
market to displace much of the exchange-traded 
derivatives market.
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two basic points that should be 
kept in mind as financial markets 
continue to evolve and policymakers 
face difficult decisions about 
setting or altering regulatory 
parameters. First, competition among 
financial institutions can promote 
beneficial changes.  With the fall in 
communication costs in the mid-19th 
century, stock exchanges in different 
geographic regions began to compete 
with each other. At various points, 
the PHLX successfully competed for 
order flow against the much larger 
NYSE by listing firms unable to list 
on the NYSE, by opening membership 
to brokerage firms that could not 
afford membership in the NYSE, 
by altering its rules to attract trades 
from institutions seeking to reward 
brokerage firms for mutual fund sales 
or to avoid the high fixed commissions 
that prevailed prior to 1975, and by 
offering fast automated executions 
for discount brokers. The PHLX also 
competed with larger exchanges by 
creating a new product, 
currency options, that 
enabled firms to hedge 
unwanted risks. 
Although 
some of these 
competitive steps, 
such as the lax 
listing standards of 
the 1920s, may have 
had adverse social 
implications, most were 
probably beneficial 
to the broader public 
interest, for they 
led to lower trading 
commissions, faster 
trading technologies, 
and new mechanisms 
to reduce risk.  The 
alleged gentleman’s 
agreement among the 
options exchanges not 
to compete in the case 
of equity options contracts already 
listed on an exchange illustrates the 
second point: Competition among 
financial institutions should not be 
taken for granted, especially when 
a small number of firms co-exist in 
markets where regulations or other 
factors create barriers to entry.  
In the case of the PHLX, its 
future is uncertain.  In equity trading, 
its market share of exchange-traded 
equities had fallen to well under 1 per-
cent by 2003.  In the trading of equity 
options, all of the floor-based exchang-
es must be worried by the rapid success 
of the all-electronic ISE. By early 2003, 
the ISE had displaced the CBOE as 
the exchange with the highest volume 
of equity options orders. In addition, 
the Boston Stock Exchange, in part-
nership with others, launched its own 
fully electronic options exchange in 
February 2004.  
The management of the 
PHLX is acutely aware that the ex-
change is a small operator in a highly 
competitive and increasingly automat-
ed trading environment.19  Manage-
ment has stated that it sees strategic 
partnerships, and perhaps mergers, 
with automated trading platforms 
and other exchanges as the best way 
to continue to attract the order flow 
and the technology that will enable 
the PHLX to compete successfully in 
the future. As part of this strategy, the 
PHLX is in the process of converting 
from a mutual institution to a for-profit 
stock corporation. Until recently, all 
securities exchanges in the U.S. were 
set up as mutual organizations, mean-
ing that the members of the exchange 
were also its owners with the right 
19  In recent testimony before Congress, the 
chairman of the PHLX (see Frucher reference) 
succinctly presented his views on the role of the 
regional exchanges, the challenges facing the 
PHLX, its business strategies, and the regulatory 
environment in which it operates.
28   Q2  2004 Business Review  www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q2  2004   29www.phil.frb.org
Given the remarkable changes 
that the PHLX — and securities 
markets generally — has made over its 
history, it would be foolish to forecast 
the future of the nation’s oldest stock 
exchange.  Perhaps the only safe state-
ment is that more changes, undoubt-
edly, lie ahead.
to approve or disapprove of proposed 
fundamental changes in an exchange’s 
operations. If the exchange were a 
for-profit corporation, its owners would 
be its shareholders, who could include 
individuals and organizations far 
removed from the securities trading 
business. PHLX management believes 
that this organizational change will 
enable the exchange to implement new 
initiatives more quickly, facilitate the 
formation of strategic relationships, 
and strengthen the exchange’s finan-
cial position, since it will be able to tap 
new sources of capital.20   
BR
20 The article by Roberta Karmel provides 
a nice summary of the motivations for a 
securities exchange to switch from a mutual 
organizational structure and reviews the process 
some exchanges in the U.S. have followed to 
achieve this end.
GLOSSARY
Securities Exchange:  A securities exchange is a centralized physical or electronic location where all buyers and sellers 
of a security can meet to trade using some type of auction process.  Generally, the buyers and sellers must conduct their 
trades through brokers who are members of the exchange.  By centralizing securities trading and setting the trading 
rules, securities exchanges reduce investors’ search costs (the cost of finding a counterparty for the trade) and transac-
tion costs (the cost of exchanging the securities and the funds).  
Over-the-Counter (OTC) Market:  An over-the-counter securities market is a decentralized market consisting of des-
ignated dealers who quote prices at which they are willing to buy or sell a specified quantity of a security.  By ensuring 
that dealers always quote buy and sell prices, an organized OTC market provides continuous liquidity for small traders.  
Broker:  A broker conducts a trade on behalf of a public investor.  The broker traditionally charges a commission for 
handling the trade.  
Specialist:  A traditional specialist is responsible for maintaining well-functioning markets for a designated security 
traded on an exchange.  The specialist sometimes functions as a broker, directing incoming orders to the best counter-
party.  The specialist also maintains the limit order book, a list of orders with designated prices that cannot be filled at 
current market prices.  Finally, the specialist trades for his or her own account but is supposed to do so only when this 
improves the market.  
Market Maker: A market maker is anyone who quotes prices and quantities at which he or she is willing to trans-
act.  Many floor-based exchanges authorize market makers to operate on the floor, competing with each other and the 
specialists and providing additional liquidity.  Market makers, like specialists, hope to profit over time by always quoting 
buying prices that are somewhat below their selling prices. This gap is called the spread.
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